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Ry Reginald Herbold Green
Do not go silent 
Into that good night 
But rage, rage
Against the dying of the light.
- Dylan Thomas
Do not cover up the scars 
.... lest it prove a hollowed shell 
And lest the feet of new-torn lives 
Sink in voids of counterfeiting 
Do not swell earth’s broken skin 
To glaze the fissures in the drum.
- Wole Soyinka
We know that history at all times draws
The strangest consequence from remotest cause.
• • • • • • •  • • • • • • •  • • • • • • •  ! • • • • • • •
Time present and time past
are both perhaps present in time Future
And time Future contained in time past......
All time is unredeemable.
- ToSo Eliot
I.
The Long Farewell
It is routine to say that over the past three decades the United 
Kingdom has bid farewell to empire, to any claim to industrial 
pre-eminence, to great powers status, to leadership in providing 
social and welfare services, to being among the pace setters in 
output per' person, to great power status. It is almost equally 
routine to say that it has yet to adjust to the external changes 
which brought about these multiple leave takings. Broadly 
speaking both perceptions are correct but both suffer from amal­
gamating unlike categories and from paying too little attention, 
to attitudes (or convictions) and styles (or stances).
The end of empi re and of great power status were inevitable and a 
least the former was in many ways desirable. The economic
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performance and failure to articulate and pursue a consistent 
international role were neither inevitable and ever consciously 
chosen. The decline from leadership to middle rank among 
industrial economies in provision of social and welfare services 
relates directly to the sluggish growth but also to a failure to 
achieve any significant reduction of economic inequality after the 
early 1950s.
The style of the farewell appears to have been - and to remain - 
that of Shakespeare’s Wolsey - "Farewell, a long farewell to all 
my greatness...." Britain has certainly not consistently stood in 
the last ditch against change. Su^ 'z was an aberration, of the 
hardline opponents of the New International Economic Order, Britain, 
has appeared the least self confident and most tempted to change 
course.
However, this style has paralysed pjriposeful seeking of change. 
Britain’s - left and right, private and public sector, sacral and 
sectoral, mandarin and trade union leader, dons and businessmen - 
have normally viewed change as something often inevitable but almost 
always damaging. The normal response has been to seek to delay 
it as long as possible, limit its scope and contain the resultant 
damage. Doubtless this stance does limit the risk of massive 
mistakes but it also prevents a positive attitude toward or use 
of change.
Today very severe national and international structural challenges - 
cultural and political, social and ethical, ecological and economic 
- confront Britain (in common with the rest of the world). The long 
farewell and the stance built by it appear to provide very poor 
foundations for facing them.
II.
I1lusions and Panaceas
Many who would accept the "long farewell" view of 1947-77 would 
argue that it has nonetheless provided the context for a 
golden age" and/or that North Sea Oil will reverse the relative 
decline. To the extent their case is that there is no more reason 
I(|i B r i a t i n  to seek to copy others (eg. Japan economically or the
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Netherlands in developing a p>ost imperial international role) it is 
correct subject to the major caveat that Britain has rarely chosen 
in a clear manner ; it has drifted. However, many of the arguments 
go further and appear, at the least, to be based on failing to ask 
basic questions. For example:
1. Britain has good relations between workers and management.
Does it? Are low strike records evidence of that or of the 
reverse? Is Grunwick atypical of small firms because of 
pre-dispute structures or because the tensions exploded into 
confrontation rather*than being successfully suppressed by 
management? There is very little evidence to support the 
generalized assertion that "they" - "we" divisions are less 
common or narrower in Britain than in other industrial capitali 
states.
2. The non-material aspects of British life are very rich because 
there is less concern for material "progress". Why then the 
very marked tension resulting wherever material progress slows 
down? Why are both large elements of the middle class and of 
the working class so vehemently determined to raise their 
share of material goods, whatever happens to anyone else
(as evidenced at the latest TUC meetings and the Tory Conferenc 
For whom are non-material rich and full? (For the intellectual 
and professional middle classes yes, but how much further 
and how generally.) To judge by many of the expressions of 
youths, blue collar workers, minorities and unemployed not for 
them. Is Britain really "better" in this area than other 
societies - some observers argue the reverse.
3. The welfare state guarantees a reasonable life and equality 
of opportunity to all. Does it? Do the benefits reach the 
most needy? (Their spokesmen deny it and cite hard evidence.) 
Are public services really improving in terms meaningful to 
users? Are they even comparable to the present general North 
European average? How much equality of opportunity really 
mean - equality of opportunity to achieve highly unequal 
rewards?
4. British democracy rests on broad participation and power in 
the hands of the people. If so why is there such nearly 
universal complaint (by very different individuals and groups) 
that they are excluded? Does the state bureaucracy as it.
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actual 1 y operates give much power to people or much breadth of 
participation? Do public corporations? Or private multi­
nationals? Or trade unions? Or political parties? Or churches?
5. Zero growth will save the environment. For those who are 
materially deprived and live in manmade wastelands? Without 
violently corrosive battles over shares? As a means to nail 
down existing inequalities and justify the continued rollback 
of the welfare and social services?
6. North Sea Oil will save Britain. If it is used to provide 
the need for making choices and changing structures? If it 
allows a retreat into Little Englandism (left, right or centre 
variant) with internal bonuses (wages or welfare or profits
or tax reductions) to paper over conflict? For how long? With 
what results when the oil boom tapers off and goes into reverse?
III.
To Change Or To Be Changed
Both the stance of the "long farewell" and that of the argued special 
virtues of Britain lead to resistance to change. This does not
' iX v y i) ' i i Jprevent change - it merely changes the tense from active (to change) 
into passive (to be changed). Thereby, the need to make choices is 
evaded but at the price of having choices made for Britain by events.
Certainly changes are proposed, choices are posed. However, the 
changes made are usually either minor or responsive not initiatory.
For example, assistance to workers and communities hurt by change|aftei 
the' damage and concentrated on propping up (slowing or halting 
change) not pre-identifying points of stress and concentrated on 
positive transformation. In that context of course workers insist 
on keeping the same jobs and communities the same firms; no other 
credible alternative is open to them. Similarly, the choices tend 
either to be rhetorical platitudes or positions hastily abandoned 
when real differences are perceived - or both. Technological 
modernization is an example of the former, the attempts to restructure 
industrial relations of the latter, overall economic policy of the 
combined variant.
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Is this pattern of drift really desired. recently it has meant 
growing inequality, increased feelings of exclusion and non- 
participation, eroding public services, loss of material welfare 
for fairly broad groups and continued deprivation (serious 
deprivation) for many others. Over 1980-1990 oil might alleviate 
sone of these tendencies only to have them recur in harsher form 
at the turn of the century. Unless that is acceptable there is 
a need to trun the "long farewell" into a renewed voyage.
IV.
Tovard What Destinations?
Before embarking on a voyage it is prudent to consider desired 
destinations - at least in terms of general directions. Otherwise 
the navigating decisions are more than a little hard to take and 
any evaluation of their acceptability even harder. Three broad 
requirements (destinations) can be advanced for Briatin:
1. Distributive Justice
Clearly this must mean more than equality of opportunity (albeit 
more of that is needed too). Some standards as to equality of 
results are also needed - probably including ceilings as well as 
floors. Distributive justice has not normally been concerned 
only with income and wealth but with workplace and community (or 
production and state) relations as well - vide the Jubilee Year 
both in the Old Testament and in Christ's preaching in the 
Synagogue. Ability to shape ones own life both individually and 
- at least equally important - by direct participation in at 
least many of the communal or collective decisions directly 
affecting it is critical. That leads into a second destination:
2. Participation
This cannot mean simply voting - albeit in many structures more 
of that would not come amiss. It needs to involve more thorough 
and more varied restructuring. On the one hand those directly 
affected by decisions need a larger and more direct share in 
taking them. On the other decisions need to be decentralized to 
a much greater extent when possible and based on aggregated bol I< 
up inputs (not top down directives without prior indirect 
participation) when decent calization to take them closer to
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those directly affected is impracticable. There is no one 
model for participation - indeed to seek one is something of 
a contradiction in terms. What is clear is that - even if this 
may appear a contradiction in terms - decentralization and 
participation should receive more central attention and uniform 
priority (and rather less lip service by those who practice 
the exact reverse) than it has had to date as well as more 
creative imagination and diverse initiatives.
3. Sustainability
To keep on providing either distributive justice or participation 
for society (and its economy) must be sustainable. This is not 
a simple issue. Transgressing inner limits by failing to provide 
adequate material and institutional resources or by failing to 
make change transformation is a violation of sustainability. So 
is transgressing outer limits by breaching ecological barriers 
or creating (perhaps in the quest for change) stresses and 
tensions which are unbearable for many individuals. Failure to 
relate these four limits to each other and to distributive 
justice and participation has tended to create an excessively 
confused debate - often verging on a dialogue of the deaf.
V.
Critical Choices/Tradeoffs
Evidently one cannot arrive at distant destinations immediately.
The Christian traditions of the radical imperfection of human 
institutions and of the struggle for justice in history hold to 
that contention as strongly as do empirical social sciences and 
common sense. Equally, given the limits (material, institutional, 
human) to change there are tradeoffs and choices. Key areas in 
which dialogue leading to considered decisions are needed include:
1. The degree of equality to be pursued as well as the areas
(power? participation? education? income? wealth? privilege?) 
to be stressed and the pace of change to be sought. The tradeoff 
here is not with growth except in the sense that growth may 
make some aspects of equality easier to pursue because there is 
sometimes less resistance to making others better off than to 
losing absolutely 000*5611. (The breadth of "differential
restoration" claims from university professors to boiler makers,
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dentists to constables, brakernen to clergy raises some doubts 
as to how generally valid that assertion is.) Basically the 
tradeoff is with polarization and tension and "too slow" a changel
is as polarizing and divisive as "too rapid".
2. The nature and rate of growth. What should grow - public 
services? Other services? Consumer durables? Overseas invest­
ment? For whose benefit? How fast should each grow? The first
question is probably the more critical. There is no reason to 
suppose that service or public service led growth is impossible. 
(The UK has a rather smaller service sector relative to overall 
output than the USA and a smaller public service one than 
Sweden or the Netherlands. These are clearly not economies 
suffering from inability to grow or evident pathological 
structural transformations.) The tradeoffs at this level are 
value or preference (or class) judgements. If one favours 
consumerism plus inequality one’s answers will be different 
from these if one believes enough is enough and inequality 
should be sharply limited by floors and ceilings. In the same 
way the tradeoffs on overall growth rates are with leisure and 
stress. (Material as non-material is a tradeoff associated 
with consumerism but not necessarily with other types of growth.) 
However, today to sustain present levels of welfare, let alone 
restore them to early 1970’s standards or reverse the plight of 
these largely excluded, Britain needs growth including growth
of exports. (Oil can be useful in this particular context - if 
used to reduce the stress of other more basic change and fill 
the resource gap until such transformations bear fruit.)
3. The nature of employment. Presumptively product employment is 
critical to effective participation. Any variant of the dole 
is socially, institutionally, and humanly corrosive even if it 
is necessary and the immediate alternatives are even worse. 
However, that does not mean that 40 hours a week, 48 weeks a 
year, 45 years need be the standard working life. Indeed unless 
one posits very high, service (and especially public service) 
centered rates of growth, the 4 0 - 4 8 - 4 5  pattern is inconsistent 
with full employment (however defined) and would condemn 
increasing proportions of would-be employers (especially youths, 
minority community members, women) to exclusion from productive 
employment. The tradeoffs are between very high growth
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(probably either technically unatl finable or unacceptable on 
human and ecological stress grounds) and both more diverse and 
less extensive working lives. Reduced hours, longer vacations, 
breaks for continuing education, earlier retirement - all are 
perfectly practicable technically and practically so economically 
Equally, all require rather more serious attention in terms of 
their positive values and their impact (good or bad) on life 
styles than they have received to date.
4. Protection of the human and material environment. Change
(whether growth or transformation) imposes strains on people 
and on ecological systems. Beyond some point - presumably 
usually relevant to place and time and type of stress - the 
strains are unacceptable. However, the irreversible, fatal, 
global and national damage case is not the typical one. 
(Ironically it is perhaps most likely that this constraint 
applies to massive, sustained global, increases in the use of 
coal - a singularly ecologically undesirable energy source 
on numerous less apocalyptic counts as well.) Freezing ecology 
in the form it happens to have today (extreme preservationism) 
hardly seems an absolute goal - some changes are probably 
desirable (eg. making the tse tse fly an "endangered species") 
and others have mixed value results (eg. woodland to sustainable 
cultivation shifts and vica versa to site the more common British 
case of 1977). To make two blades grow where one grew befor ■ 
is often a good thing, but to be sure one must examine the 
context - in the hills of the Lebanon it has as times clearly beei 
a very bad thing with consequences which are now irreversible.
VI.
Britain And The World
It can be asked how the foregoing relates to Britain's contribution 
to international order transformation. On the face of it the issues 
and choices are last in a British not a global context. However, for 
at least three reasons that is probably too narrow an interpretation,
1. Britain's impact abroad and its choices internationally are likel 
to be dominated by what type of society making what choices 
Britain is at home. Denial of basic human needs at home and the.i
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effective support abroad is not a very plausible combination. 
(Granted a society can pr¿ict.ise distributive justice at home 
and predation abroad. However, doemstic commitment to and 
progress toward distributive justice, participation and 
sustainability at home is a necessary, even if not a sufficient 
condition for making a positive contribution to them inter­
nationally . )
2. Britain’s ability to participate credibly in any international 
order changes has been eroded by the "long farewell" and 
especially by the delaying, limiting, containing rather than 
choosing, shaping, transforming approach to change. It is 
hard to see how this erosion can be halted internationally 
without altering the domestic stance and direction.
3. Unless Britain changes its own image and some aspects of its 
performance at home it is hard to see how it will have material 
resources, experiences or ideas to contribute to reshaping the 
global order.
VII.
Bri11sh Choices And British Chri stians
Perhaps a more basic query is what any of the foregoing has to do 
with Christianity, the Church or British Christians as Christians. 
Many - probably including a majority of that minority of Britainá 
who attend services - would contend that it is wholly' secular.
Whether this is so depends on ones perception of Christianity. If 
the Church is in (even though not all) the world it must be 
engaged in temporal concerns so far as they relate to the nature 
of man and of God. Distributive justice, participation and 
sustainability all appear to fall squarely within that definition. 
The words are "man does not live by bread alone" not "man does not 
live by bread"; Christ did feed the 5,000 materially as a prelude 
to feeding them with the word of God.
If that is a valid perception of the calling of the Church to 
minister of temporal affairs as part of the struggle for justice 
in history and of the calling of Christians to inform their 
total lives by their faith then one has another - and longer -
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farewell to reverse. That i£ the decline not simply (or even 
primarily) of Church influence on state or control over artifactual 
canons of conduct but of Christian involvement in issues of central
moral because of central temporal importance. The dialogue on
activism versus aloof evangelism or pietism is itself a very 
narrow one - most Christians do not comprehend it because they 
neither see Christianity as integrally informing their secular lives
nor are deeply committed to any eschatalogical , pictistic or
mystical faith. To challenge that modern variant of "Laodecianism" 
(neither hot nor cold) is hardly likely to reduce tension but 
without a real transformation of stance and commitment at the 
congregational and individual Christian level one must wonder whether 
the Church in Britain is not itself in danger of engaging in a 
"long farewell" however clearly it relates them to the Bible, the 
Gospel, the Father or the theological heritage.
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